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Abstract 
This paper defines fiscal impulse as a measure of whether government fiscal policy 
decisions are adding to, or subtracting from, aggregate demand pressures in the 
economy.  When assessing the effects of fiscal policy on the economy it can be useful to 
have an approximate estimate of fiscal impulse.  Estimates of fiscal impulse range from 
simple indicators based on fiscal aggregates, to more complicated approaches requiring 
greater use of judgement and economic theory.  This paper develops reasonably simple 
indicators based on adjusted fiscal aggregates.  It also sets out some sensitivity analysis.  
The indicators reflect intuitive assessments about changes in New Zealand fiscal policy 
over the last decade and looking forward into the forecast period.  Although estimates are 
relatively insensitive to alternative assumptions, this is likely to be the result of the relative 
stability of the time period under consideration.  Simple indicators of fiscal impulse have 
limitations.  At best they can only provide an indication of the first round impact of changes 
in discretionary fiscal policy.  A more complete assessment of the effects of fiscal policy 
on the economy requires a full-scale macroeconomic model, perhaps complemented with 
time series analysis.  
   
JEL CLASSIFICATION  E62 - Fiscal Policy  
H60 – National Budget, Deficit and Debt: General 
 
KEYWORDS  Fiscal impulse; cyclical-adjustment; aggregate demand; New 
Zealand. 
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Indicators of Fiscal Impulse for 
New Zealand 
1 Introduction 
Assessments of the influence of fiscal policy on the economy often use terminology such 
as a “tighter fiscal stance” or “contractionary fiscal policy”.
1
  The actual fiscal balance may 
not be a good measure of changes in fiscal policy.  This is largely because developments 
in the actual balance reflect both changes in fiscal policy as well as how changes in the 
economy influence tax revenue and government spending.  The aim of this paper is to 
develop a measure of whether changes in fiscal policy are adding to, or subtracting from, 
aggregate demand pressures in the economy.  Consistent with the terminology generally 
used in this literature, we define such a measure as an indicator of fiscal impulse. 
Indicators of fiscal impulse can be a useful component in a fiscal analysis toolkit that also 
contains measures of the structural fiscal position, analysis of tax and spending trends, 
and longer-term fiscal projections.  Indicators of fiscal impulse can enhance the ex post 
interpretation of changes in fiscal policy as well as helping to identify relatively large ex 
ante forecast changes in fiscal policy.  However, we do not see impulse indicators as 
some sort of stop or go trigger for fiscal policy initiatives.  Policy initiatives should also be 
assessed with reference to underlying micro-economic and public finance analysis.   
Ideally, fiscal impulse indicators would be augmented with assessments derived from 
macroeconomic and perhaps time series models.  Further, while assessments of fiscal 
impulse may play an information role, their calculation does not imply a shift in fiscal policy 
away from its current medium-term focus to a more active counter-cyclical role.  Indeed, 
the analysis in this paper constitutes a significant health warning to the unqualified use of 
fiscal impulse indicators. 
The limited availability of fiscal information on a consistent basis restricts historical 
estimates of fiscal indicators for New Zealand.
2
  The analysis in this paper covers the 
period from the early 1990s to the end of the 2002 Budget forecast horizon (year ending 
June 2006).  Key features of fiscal policy over this period are, first, the shift from persistent 
operating deficits to consecutive operating surpluses since 1994 and a significant 
reduction in the ratio of public debt to gross domestic product (GDP).
3
   Second, forecasts 
of the fiscal position in the mid 1990s indicated scope for a fiscal adjustment, and the then 
                                                                 
1 Typical examples include the Economist’s assessment of fiscal policy in the United Kingdom (“The fiscal arithmetic: Luck and 
judgment” The Economist, March 25, 2000, p.66) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) assessment of Irish fiscal policy (IMF, 
2001a).  
2 The Crown Financial Statements (CFS) are based on generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP). They are presented on a June 
year basis, starting with the year ended June 1994.  GAAP information required for fiscal impulse analysis is available from 1992. 
3 See Wells (1996) and Janssen (2001) for discussion of fiscal policy in New Zealand.  
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Government announced tax reductions and additional spending.  Third, looking forward, 
the current Government is aiming to run operating surpluses.  
One of the requirements of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 is for the Government to set 
long-term fiscal objectives.  The Government formulates its budget to ensure that 
aggregate levels of taxation and spending, including forecast new operating and capital 
spending, are consistent with progress towards its long-term fiscal objectives.  Adjustment 
towards the objectives may result in changes to the fiscal balance over time.  These 
changes are not necessarily a deliberate attempt to influence aggregate demand.  Rather 
they are the consequence of a number of individual budget decisions and progression 
towards the long-term fiscal objectives. 
Nonetheless, Governments may also be concerned about macroeconomic stability and 
therefore the potential short-term impact of fiscal policy on aggregate demand.  For 
example, strongly pro-cyclical fiscal policy could place additional pressure on monetary 
policy and lead to undesirable swings in interest rates and the exchange rate.  Because 
large changes in fiscal policy may have an impact on aggregate demand in the economy, 
they will need to be taken into account by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), 
which operates to achieve an inflation target.
4
   
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows.  Section 2 sets out definitions of fiscal 
impulse and discusses some of the limitations of simple aggregate indicators.  Section 3 
outlines issues that arise in estimating indicators of fiscal impulse.  Section 4 provides 
estimates and sensitivity analysis for New Zealand.  Finally, Section 5 provides concluding 
remarks. 
                                                                 
4 In New Zealand, co-ordination between monetary and fiscal authorities does not take the form of the authorities acting to pursue joint 
policy objectives.  Rather, the frameworks rely on transparency, a medium-term focus and consultation. See the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand submission to the Independent Review of the Operation of Monetary Policy, supporting document on “Fiscal and monetary 
coordination” (www.rbnz.govt.nz/monpol/review) and Svensson (2001). Analysis of macroeconomic policy co-ordination in the 
United Kingdom by Bhundia and O’Donnell (2002) provides further context to the New Zealand situation.     
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2  Definitions, Limitations and Other 
Approaches 
2.1 Definitions 
Wells (1995, p.76) notes that 'single-number' measures such as the fiscal balance are 
often used in policy discussions regarding fiscal policy.  He suggests that in an IS-LM 
model, a definition of fiscal stimulus or contraction is given by the degree to which 
changes in fiscal instruments shift the IS curve.  As a result, it is not the level but the 
change in the fiscal balance that provides an indicator of fiscal stimulus or contraction. 
Wells (1995) sees two drawbacks in using the change in the fiscal balance as an indicator 
of fiscal policy effects.  First, both changes in private-sector demand and fiscal 
instruments (tax rates and spending plans) can influence changes in the actual fiscal 
balance.  The most common approach to this drawback is to estimate a cyclically adjusted 
or structural fiscal balance.  The structural fiscal balance is an indicator of what the fiscal 
balance would be if the economy were operating at potential output.  Second, because of 
inherent differences in each of the fiscal instruments, they should be weighted to reflect 
their initial impact on aggregate demand.  This leads to the use of what is sometimes 
termed the weighted budget balance. 
In this paper we focus on changes in discretionary policy that are likely to have an effect 
on aggregate demand.  A focus on changes in discretionary policy implies the use of a 
structural fiscal balance that excludes cyclical influences.  For example, consider the case 
of unemployment expenditure.  Changes in unemployment expenditure occur through 
changes in unemployment numbers and/or changes in unemployment benefit rates.  The 
effect of cyclical changes in unemployment numbers is considered non-discretionary and 
would be excluded from the measure of fiscal impulse.  The effect of changes in 
unemployment benefit rates is discretionary.  
Isolating discretionary policy changes is not straightforward.    For example, an exogenous 
and non-cyclical increase in the number of hospital patients can require increased 
spending on healthcare.  Although such exogenous factors are largely non-discretionary 
(for given health policy), a government will need to take them into account when making 
budget decisions.  A government has the discretion over whether to accommodate non-
discretionary changes, or to offset them with discretionary changes elsewhere in the 
budget.   
Isolating the non-cyclical or structural component recognises the role of so-called 
automatic fiscal stabilisers.
5
  For example, consider the case where forecasts indicate a 
significant deterioration in the overall fiscal balance.  If this is due in large part to a 
forecast cyclical downturn, then although the change appears expansionary, it is reflecting 
the role of automatic stabilisers.  The onset of the downturn may result in a fiscal deficit 
under policies that would otherwise have generated a balance or surplus.   
                                                                 
5 Automatic stabilisers are those aspects of tax and spending systems that tend to smooth output over the economic cycle. For 
example, during an upswing, incomes tend to rise, resulting in higher tax receipts, while falling unemployment lowers unemployment 
expenditure. The strength of these stabilisers will depend on the specific features of the tax and spending systems. Often these 
features are the result of various policy decisions rather than any conscious decision to optimise the stabilising features of taxes and 
spending.  See Auerbach and Feenburg (2000) for a detailed analysis of the stabilising aspects of taxes.      
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If the cyclical downturn does not eventuate then the extent of automatic fiscal stabilisation 
will have been less.  The change in the actual fiscal balance would ex post appear less 
expansionary.  Since we are interested in the discretionary fiscal policy, rather than the 
overall fiscal impact, then it is important to distinguish between a fiscal loosening that 
arises from cyclical effects versus one that arises from discretionary changes.   
Overall, the exclusion of cyclical influences means that we draw a distinction between the 
actual fiscal balance and estimates of the structural fiscal balance.  We define the change 
in the structural fiscal balance as a measure of fiscal impulse.  An increase (decrease) in 
the structural deficit (surplus) represents an expansionary fiscal impulse.  Some authors 
describe the structural fiscal balance as a measure of fiscal stance.  We emphasise the 
change in the structural balance for two reasons.  First, given the methodologies typically 
used, the level of the structural balance has a degree of arbitrariness, whereas changes 
from year to year provide a reasonable indication of fiscal trends.  Second, the change in 
the structural balance is a measure of whether fiscal policy is adding to, or subtracting 
from, aggregate demand pressures in the economy.  Section 3 discusses the precise 
definition of which fiscal balance is relevant for the estimation of fiscal impulse indicators, 
and how the structural balance is derived.     
2.2 Limitations 
Cyclically-adjusted, or structural fiscal balances are one of the most common summary 
indicators of the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity, with increases in the 
structural deficit interpreted as expansionary, and decreases as contractionary (see 
Blanchard, 1993).   
Blanchard (1993) provides an important survey of the limitations to short-term fiscal 
indicators.
6
  First, Blanchard notes the original purpose of the structural, or cyclically 
adjusted balance (CAB) was to assess what the budget balance would be if the economy 
were at full employment.  Blanchard questions whether the CAB is well suited to the task 
of assessing the effects of fiscal policy on the economy.  For example, fiscal policy 
operates through two main channels, distortions created by the tax system and the effect 
of fiscal policy on aggregate demand.  He argues that the CAB is only aimed at this latter 
channel.  Second, Blanchard draws a distinction between the impact effect of fiscal policy 
and the final effect.  The latter requires consideration of general equilibrium effects on 
interest rates, exchange rates and output.  In Blanchard’s view an indicator can only 
measure impact effects and even then he is doubtful about the use of the CAB in this role.  
For example, a measure of fiscal impact will also depend on assumptions about the future 
because consumption does not depend only on current income.   
More recently, Chalk (2002) investigates two propositions concerning the use of structural 
measures as indicators of fiscal policy.  The first is that the change in the primary (i.e., 
excluding interest payments) structural balance provides a better indicator of discretionary 
fiscal policy than the change in the primary balance.  The second is that the change in the 
structural balance is a good indicator of the demand stimulus arising from changes in the 
fiscal position. 
Interest payments are excluded from the first proposition since they are non-discretionary.  
The primary balance represents the fiscal position excluding the current period effects of 
past deficits and surpluses.  In contrast, because interest payments may have an impact 
                                                                 
6 Blanchard (1990) is the earlier version of this survey. Similar issues are discussed in Chouraqui, Hagemann and Sartor (1990).    
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on aggregate demand, Proposition two uses the overall structural balance rather than the 
primary structural balance. Japan and Germany provide the case studies for assessing 
the propositions.  Proposition one is assessed by comparing changes in the estimated 
primary structural balance, and the primary balance, with qualitative evidence on the 
timing of fiscal policy measures and quantitative evidence on their size.  Proposition two is 
assessed by comparing changes in the estimated structural balance with a measure of 
demand stimulus, where this is a weighted budget balance derived using national 
accounts data rather than budgetary data.  Overall, Chalk concludes that, first; changes in 
both structural primary balances and primary balances are found to be poor descriptors of 
changes in discretionary fiscal policy.  For Germany the structural primary balance is 
somewhat better than the primary balance.  Second, changes in structural indicators 
appear to correspond poorly to the size of the demand stimulus generated by fiscal 
policy.
7
  For Japan the structural balance gives a reasonable estimate of the demand 
impact of fiscal policy.  Nonetheless, it is unable to capture the effects of compositional 
changes in fiscal policy. 
Chalk also compares changes in the structural fiscal balance with a measure of fiscal 
impulse previously used by the International Monetary Fund (see Heller, Haas and 
Mansur, 1986) and explained in the Appendix of this paper.  Chalk finds that for Japan 
and Germany, and for a broader sample of OECD countries, there is little difference 
between fiscal impulse derived from the Heller et al. approach and changes in the 
structural fiscal balance.   
Although the structural fiscal balance has its drawbacks, evidence that it may not be a 
good indicator of aggregate demand impact arises largely when it is extended beyond its 
original purpose.  It might be better to think of the structural balance as an indicator of the 
underlying fiscal position.  An increasing structural balance should therefore be 
interpreted as a non-cyclical strengthening of the fiscal position, rather than an indication 
of aggregate demand impact.   
Whether the Chalk results hold for New Zealand would require a more detailed qualitative 
and quantitative identification of discretionary policy changes together with a weighted 
budget balance measure.  As discussed in Section 4, the indicators of fiscal impulse 
derived in this paper reflect the major discretionary fiscal policy changes of the 1990s.  A 
more detailed analysis along weighted budget balance lines would introduce significantly 
more judgement.  A summary of previous Treasury analysis along weighted budget lines 
is presented in the Appendix.   
Finally, there are issues from theoretical and empirical perspectives as to what the short-
term effects of fiscal policy actually are.  In a summary of the theoretical literature, 
Hemming, Mahfouz and Schimmelpfennig (2002) conclude that fiscal multipliers are more 
likely to be positive and quite large when: 
•   There is excess capacity, the economy is either closed or it is open and the exchange 
rate is fixed, and households have limited time horizons or are liquidity constrained. 
•   Increased government spending does not substitute for private spending, it enhances 
the productivity of labour and capital, and lower taxes increase labour supply and/or 
investment. 
•   Government debt is low and the government does not face financing constraints. 
                                                                 
7 Simple indicators implicitly assume that equal increases in both taxes and spending exert no net impact on aggregate demand. The 
multipliers on taxes and spending can differ. Chalk notes that the demand effect obtained from the weighted budget balance may be 
mis-measured given the varying evidence on the size of fiscal multipliers.   
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•  There is an accompanying monetary expansion with limited inflationary 
consequences (e.g., because of wage restraint). 
Fiscal multipliers are likely to be smaller, and could turn negative, when: 
•  There is crowding out as interest rates rise and a flexible exchange rate appreciates 
in response to a fiscal expansion, especially if there are rational expectations and a 
fiscal expansion is perceived to be permanent. 
•  Households are Ricardian, in which case a permanent fiscal expansion can reduce 
consumption, this effect being stronger if households anticipate that distortionary 
taxes will have to rise in the future. 
•  There is a debt sustainability problem and risk premia on interest rates are large, in 
which case a credible fiscal contraction can result in a large fall in interest rates. 
•  Expansionary fiscal policy increases uncertainty which leads to more cautious saving 
and investment decisions by households and firms. 
Hemming, Mahfouz and Schimmelpfennig list the main conclusions from the empirical 
literature as: 
•  Estimates of fiscal multipliers are overwhelmingly positive but small. Short-term 
multipliers average around 0.5 for taxes and 1 for spending, with only modest 
variation across countries and models (albeit with some outliers).  There are hardly 
any instances of negative fiscal multipliers, the exception being that they can be 
generated in some macroeconomic models with strong credibility effects. 
•  There is nevertheless evidence of non-Keynesian expansionary fiscal contractions.  
Expansionary fiscal contractions appear to be more likely where a fiscal contraction is 
large and focuses on cuts in unproductive spending; occurs against a background of 
high debt, together with large premia on interest rates; is accompanied or preceded 




•  There is little evidence of crowding out through interest rates or the exchange rate.  
Neither full Ricardian equivalence nor a significant partial Ricardian offset gets much 
support from the evidence. 
2.3 Other  approaches 
Indicators of fiscal impulse will only ever be, at best a guide to the initial impact of fiscal 
policy.  For example, an increase in government spending could add to aggregate 
demand pressures in the first instance.  However, as firms and households react to this 
increase in government spending, they may change their investment and consumption 
behaviour.  A simple indicator cannot capture these second-round effects.  The final effect 
of fiscal policy changes on aggregate demand needs to take account of the dynamic 
effects through time.  As Blanchard (1993) argues, to make a more complete assessment 
of the effects of fiscal policy on aggregate demand requires a full-scale macroeconomic 
model. 
There are a number of papers that use macroeconomic models to examine the effect of 
fiscal policy on the economy.  For example, Hall and Rae (1998) examine the effect of a 
fiscal expansion in New Zealand using the NBNZ-DEMONZ model.  They consider how 
the results are dependent on the financial market response and the monetary policy 
                                                                 
8 See for example, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Perotti (1999).    
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reaction, and the difference between a fiscal expansion achieved through tax cuts and 
increased spending.  Modelling the effect of fiscal policy using the New Zealand Treasury 
Model (NZTM) is an area for further work.
9
 
As a complement to macroeconomic models, which through their assumptions can pre-
determine the effect of fiscal policy (see Blanchard, 2000), Blanchard and Perotti (1999) 
use a structural vector-autoregression (VAR) approach to estimate the dynamic effect of 
fiscal policy on US economic activity.  This approach takes into account not just the initial 
impact on the economy, but how the impact changes through time.  Blanchard and Perotti 
use the observation that within a quarter, there is little or no discretionary response of 
fiscal policy to unexpected movements in economic activity.  Combining this with 
institutional information about the tax and transfer systems as well as the timing of tax 
collections allows Blanchard and Perotti to construct estimates of the automatic effects of 
unexpected movements in activity on fiscal variables, and, by implication, obtain estimates 
of exogenous fiscal policy shocks.  Having identified these shocks, they then trace their 
dynamic effects on output.  The results consistently show that positive government 
spending shocks have a positive effect on output, and positive tax shocks have a negative 
effect.  The multipliers for both spending and tax shocks are typically small, often close to 
one. 
                                                                 
9 The New Zealand Treasury Model is currently being refined and documented (for example, see Szeto, 2001, 2002).    
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3  Issues in Estimating Indicators of Fiscal 
Impulse 
Notwithstanding the limitations discussed in Section 2, we consider it useful to estimate 
indicators of fiscal impulse.  Estimating these indicators involves a number of judgements, 
such as the appropriate measure of the fiscal balance, the nature of capital adjustments 
and the approach taken to isolating discretionary fiscal policy.  The following sub-sections 
outline these judgements in more detail. 
3.1  Measures of the fiscal balance 
The most commonly reported measure of fiscal balance in New Zealand is the operating 
balance from the Statement of Financial Performance.  The operating balance is the 
difference between the government’s current operating revenues and current operating 
expenses and so is a measure of saving.  This measure differs from more traditional cash 
based measures where government spending typically includes current items and capital 
items.  The operating balance is an accrual measure based on generally accepted 
accounting practice (GAAP) and so reflects accounting standards.  It includes non-cash 
items such as depreciation and revaluation effects.  In contrast, the OBERAC (Operating 
Balance Excluding Revaluations and Accounting policy Changes), excludes the following 
revaluation effects (unless the revaluation is the result of a policy decision): 
•  Net present valued liabilities such as the outstanding claims liability of the Accident 
Compensation Corporation (ACC) and Government Superannuation Fund (GSF) 
pension liability. 
•  Market valued financial assets and liabilities, such as tradeable marketable securities 
and deposits. 
•  Gains or losses on asset sales. 
The OBERAC also excludes accounting policy changes (for example, changes around the 
recognition of assets and liabilities).
10
  Revaluation and accounting policy changes are 
less likely to have a direct impact on aggregate demand than other income and spending 
items, although they may have indirect or second round effects.  Two options are 
available for the purposes of calculating fiscal impulse.  The first is to start with the 
OBERAC and exclude other non-cash items such as depreciation and the retained 
surpluses of State-owned enterprises and Crown entities.  The second option is to start 
directly with a cash measure of the fiscal balance, that is, net cash flows from operations 
(NCFFO) from the Statement of Cash Flows.   NCFFO is the difference between cash 
operating receipts and cash operating expenditures.  The Statement of Cash Flows does 
not explicitly include depreciation. Although the path of depreciation over time is generally 
smooth, actual purchases of physical assets can occur in a more lumpy fashion and will 
include spending that increases the asset base.   
Internationally, fiscal indicators are calculated from a range of sources, including 
budgetary accounts, the System of National Accounts (SNA) and Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS).  Both SNA93 and revised GFS (GFS2001, see IMF, 2001b) are accrual 
frameworks based on statistical standards.  The revised GFS framework is harmonised 
with SNA93 although the coverage of a particular category of transaction may differ 
slightly.  Its primary aim is to provide a comprehensive conceptual and accounting 
                                                                 
10 See the December Economic and Fiscal Update 2001, pp.60-61 for details of the OBERAC calculation.  
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framework for analysing and evaluating fiscal policy, especially the performance of the 
general government sector with a focus on taxes, spending, borrowing and lending (IMF, 
2001b, pp.1-3).  The balance in GFS and SNA that comes closest to our definition is “net 
lending/borrowing”.  In GFS, net lending is the net operating balance less net acquisition 
of non-financial assets.  The GFS net operating balance is “net” in the sense that it 
includes depreciation as an expense.  In SNA, net lending is the difference between 
saving and investment.      
Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) prepares government sector fiscal information on an SNA93 
basis as part of the Institutional Sector Accounts (ISA).  The government sectors (central 
and local) in the ISA are annual March year experimental series published with a lag (they 
are currently available from 1987 to 1998).
11
  Saving of the general government in the ISA 
is an unofficial component of the official national saving statistic produced by SNZ.         
Publication by SNZ of GFS accounts in line with the revised manual is a medium-term 
project.  To calculate fiscal impulse on an SNA (or GFS) basis for the most recent years 
and over the forecast period would require the detailed conversion of GAAP information.
12
  
We restrict calculations to GAAP-based indicators. 
3.2  Measures of capital transactions 
Ideally, the fiscal impulse indicator would include capital transactions that have an impact 
on aggregate demand.  It is useful to examine how other countries adjust for capital.       
The United Kingdom Treasury uses cyclically-adjusted public sector net borrowing as an 
indicator of the short-term impact of fiscal policy on the economy, so as to include 
investment decisions (HM Treasury, 1999).  Public sector net borrowing is defined as net 
investment less the surplus on current budget.  The capital transactions included in public 
sector net borrowing are capital formation (acquisition of fixed assets, stocks and 
valuables net of any sales), plus net acquisition of land, and net payments of investment 
grants.  The Australian Treasury (1997, 1999) uses net lending, which is the net operating 
balance less net capital investment.
13
 
The impact on aggregate demand will depend on the nature of the capital transaction.  For 
example, sales of existing assets represent a transfer of resources and are unlikely to 
have a significant effect on demand.  In addition, for a small open economy like New 
Zealand, many large government capital items are imported, for example defence assets, 
and therefore will not impact on domestic demand. 
3.3  Approaches to identifying discretionary fiscal policy 
There are a number of approaches that can be used to estimate the effect of the 
economic cycle and so calculate the structural fiscal balance (see Giorno, Richardson, 
Roseveare and van den Noord, 1995; Bank of Italy, 1999; van den Noord, 2000).  A 
                                                                 
11 The central government sector (3.1) comprises government departments, offices of Parliament and most Crown entities. It excludes 
Housing New Zealand Corporation and the RBNZ, which is included in sector 2.1 (financial intermediaries). State-owned enterprises 
are part of sector 1 (producer enterprises). The SNZ Crown Accounts (also from 1987) are a narrower subset of the ISA government 
sector and are annual June year official series published with a lag of four to five months. 
12 The New Zealand Treasury is currently involved in a project with SNZ that involves a detailed reconciliation of GAAP and SNA fiscal 
information.    
13 The net operating balance is a GFS concept (although not GFS2001). It differs from the operating result prepared under Australian 
Accounting Standards partly because it excludes valuation changes. GFS does not consider these as transactions and includes them 
as other economic flows that affect GFS assets and liabilities. See Budget Paper No.1, Statement 10: External reporting standards and 
budget concepts, www.budget.gov.au/2002-03.    
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common approach is a two-step methodology that utilises an estimate of the output gap 
together with a set of elasticities of tax and spending to output.  The New Zealand 
Treasury regularly publishes a structural OBERAC estimated using this two-step method 
(see the Appendix).  The OBERAC and estimated structural OBERAC are shown in 
Figure 1.  Tam and Kirkham (2001) find that the calculation of the structural balance for 
New Zealand using the two-step method is sensitive to the output gap calculation.   
 
Figure 1 - OBERAC and estimated structural OBERAC 
 
Note: As at Budget 2002 
Source: The Treasury 
 
There are two disadvantages in using Treasury’s method as an input into the estimation of 
fiscal impulse.  First, the current methodology does not make any adjustment for cyclical 
variations in interest rates and inflation.  However, this problem has become less 
important as inflation rates have declined and become more stable.  Moreover, since we 
are interested in discretionary policy, then net interest payments would be excluded in 
order to focus on the primary structural balance.  Second, the current methodology is 
sensitive to estimates of potential output, which are uncertain, especially toward the end 
of the sample period and into the forecast horizon.  These are the periods where 
discretionary policy changes and fiscal impulse may be of most interest.  Blanchard 
(1993) points out that the CAB was not designed as an indicator of changes in 

















WP 02/30 |  INDICATORS OF FISCAL IMPULSE FOR NEW ZEALAND  11  
Instead, Blanchard suggests the use of an indexed approach.  His suggested indicator of 
discretionary fiscal policy has become known as the Blanchard Fiscal Impulse (BFI) (see 
for example, Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 1997; and various papers in Bank of Italy, 1999).  
The BFI is defined as the value of the primary surplus which would have prevailed, were 
unemployment at the same value as in the previous year, minus the value of the primary 
surplus in the previous year, both as a ratio to GDP in each year (see Blanchard, 1993).  
Blanchard removes net interest payments as a simple way of adjusting the balance for 
changes in inflation and real interest rates.  Fluctuations in net interest payments are also 
considered non-discretionary.  The BFI is essentially a cyclical adjustment that eliminates 
from the fiscal balance changes in taxes and transfers due to changes in the 
unemployment rate (Alesina and Perotti, 1997). 
Although the BFI approach avoids the need to estimate potential output, Kearney, McCoy, 
Duffy, McMahon and Smyth (2000) note that it assumes a stable relationship between 
changes in unemployment and economic activity, which may not be appropriate 
(especially during periods of structural change). 
Another approach is to use a structural VAR, which takes into account any feedback 
between fiscal policy and the economic cycle (see Bouthevillain and Quinet, 1999; 
Kearney et al., 2000).  The structural balance estimated via the two-step method attempts 
to remove the effect of the economic cycle on the fiscal balance, but ignores the fact that 
the fiscal balance also may affect the economic cycle.  Bouthevillain and Quinet (1999) 
and Kearney et al. (2000) estimate a two-variable structural VAR model that decomposes 
fluctuations in the deficit-to-GDP ratio into those arising from shocks to output (assumed 
to have permanent effects) and changes in the deficit itself (assumed to have transitory 
effects).   
However, Kearney et al. suggest that the structural VAR method can be unreliable in the 
presence of structural change.  Other disadvantages of this method are that the identifying 
procedure is subjective so that the estimates are sensitive to small changes in the 
restrictions.  In addition, the structural VAR method is not simple to update when new 
information becomes available, making it difficult to monitor an indicator based on a 
structural VAR approach on a regular basis.  
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4  Estimates of Fiscal Impulse for New 
Zealand 
This section provides estimates of fiscal impulse for New Zealand from 1992 until the end 
of the 2002 Budget forecast horizon (year ended June 2006).  The section also examines 
sensitivities of a “base indicator” to some of the key judgements outlined above.   
4.1  Fiscal balance, capital and cyclical adjustment 
From the discussion in Section 3.1, the calculations are based on GAAP information.  In 
using GAAP we still need to establish the appropriate definition of government.  For 
example, should the measure include State-owned enterprises and Crown entities?   
State-owned enterprises are excluded because of the independence they have regarding 
operating and capital decisions.  We have excluded third party revenues to Crown entities 
as well as their capital spending.  On the operating side, because Crown entities are 
largely involved in delivering core Crown services (e.g., health and education), much of 
their income and spending is captured in the core.  Table 1 provides the transactions 
included in the calculations, using a stylised representation of the segment notes to the 
GAAP financial statements.  Note that total Crown consolidates the core Crown with 
State-owned enterprises and Crown entities on a line-by-line basis.
14
  The table identifies 
those transactions relevant to the base indicator and those that are not applicable. 
 
Table 1 – Definition of government for base indicator of fiscal impulse 
  Core Crown  Crown entities  State-owned 
enterprises 
Income Yes  NA  NA 
  Investment income  NA  NA  NA 
Current spending  Yes  NA  NA 
  Finance costs  NA  NA  NA 
Capital spending  Yes  NA  NA 
Notes: NA indicates that the transaction is not applicable to the base indicator of fiscal impulse. 
Income for the Core is largely tax. Crown entities are funded from the core and 
third-party revenues. Income for State-owned enterprises comes from the sales of 
goods and services. The table ignores inter-segment eliminations.  
Section 3.1 noted two options for the fiscal balance.  Although the OBERAC is the more 
familiar concept, we start directly with a cash measure, net cash flows from operations 
(NCFFO).  Over the period 1992 to 2001 the correlation coefficient between the annual 
primary NCFFO and the annual primary OBERAC (before depreciation) is 0.986.   
Because we are interested in a primary concept, the fiscal balance is calculated before 
investment income (i.e., interest income and dividend income) and finance costs.   In 
terms of capital transactions, there are five items in the Statement of Cash Flows that are 
potentially relevant for the capital adjustment.  Items that have the greatest impact are 
likely to be those that increase the demand on real resources, as opposed to transactions 
that simply transfer resource use from one sector to another.  Table 2 lists the five items 
                                                                 
14 Details on full line-by-line consolidation can be found in the 2002 Budget Economic and Fiscal Update (pp. 97-105).  
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of physical and financial capital, along with a judgement about whether these are likely to 




Table 2 – Capital transactions 
Capital transaction  Likely impact on aggregate 
demand 
Reason 
Net purchases of physical assets.*  
 
Yes for most except defence 
purchases. 
Defence assets are largely imported.  
Net increases in advances (this is largely 
loans to students and hospitals). 
Yes for student loans. 
Yes for loans to hospitals 
(excluding refinancing of existing 
loans). 
No for other advances. 
Student loans largely spent on 
consumption.  Loans to hospitals are 
largely for capital expenditure.  
 
Net purchases of investments (this 
includes capital injections to State-
owned enterprises and Crown entities, 
purchase and sale of existing entities). 
Yes for capital expenditures. 
No for purchase / sale of existing 
entities. 
 
Most capital injections are likely to be 
for capital expenditure.  Purchases 
and sales of existing entities represent 
a transfer of resources. 
Forecast for future new capital spending. 
This is an amount for capital spending 
included in forecasts (part of this will 
increase the existing physical asset 
base). 
Yes for most. 
No for defence. 
Some of the forecast amount will be 
spent on purchases of physical assets.  
Some will also be spent on defence, 
which is largely imported. 
 
Contributions to New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund (involves investing 
in financial assets for future NZS 
expenses). 
Unlikely.  Likely to have little direct effect.  Will 
be invested in financial assets, and it 
is likely that a large portion will be 
invested offshore. 
Note: “Net” in this table means net of sales as opposed to net of depreciation. Purchases of physical assets in the cash flow statement 
are not directly comparable with SNA public investment contained in Treasury’s SNA economic forecasts. 
Core Crown physical assets are largely in land, buildings, military equipment and state 
highways.  Core Crown physical assets are around twice the value of Crown entity 
physical assets, where the latter are largely in housing, health and education.  Advances 
and net purchases of investments (excluding asset sales/purchases) can be included in 
the capital adjustment as a proxy for discretionary new capital spending outside the core 
Crown.  However, on the withdrawal side this ignores third-party revenue levied by entities 
outside the core.  On the injections side it may not capture all capital spending.  Refining 
the fiscal impulse indicator to better capture the role of Crown entities is an area for further 
investigation.  This will likely utilise the more detailed information available under full line-
by-line consolidation and will shift the measure to more closely reflect the first two 
columns in Table 1 above.  Based on Table 2, the capital adjustment in our base indicator 
includes: net purchase of physical assets (excluding defence), the forecast of future new 
capital spending (excluding expected defence capital) and increases in student loans.  We 
examine the effect of alternative capital adjustments in the sensitivity analysis of Section 
4.4. 
In GAAP, asset sales and purchases flow through the Statement of Cash Flows and not 
the Statement of Financial Performance.  We follow Heller et al. (1986) in excluding the 
sale or purchase of state-owned entities from the calculations.  In a traditional cash based 
measure of the fiscal balance, the sale of an asset is included as an item “above the line”.  
                                                                 
15 This is somewhat arbitrary because we have not made similar judgements on the operating side. However, because fiscal impulse is 
measured as a change, the lumpy nature of capital means the adjustments will be more important on the capital side.    
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The sale results in a cash surplus or reduced deficit because it lowers the governments 
borrowing requirement.  In a national accounts framework the sale is not treated as a 
revenue item because it is not directly related to economic activity.  Rather, the 
government has changed the composition of its assets (see Heller et al., 1986, p.28).   
Finally, Treasury’s two-step cyclical adjustment method is used to remove the effect of the 
economic cycle because it is already a method used by the Treasury, and it is reasonably 
simple to update.  The adjustment is applied only to the operating components of the 
NCFFO.   The capital component is not cyclically adjusted. 
4.2 Base  indicator 
Using information from the Budget Economic and Fiscal Update 2002, Table 3 sets out 
the calculation of a base indicator of fiscal impulse.  The fiscal balance reported in Table 3 
deducts capital spending (line ‘b’) from primary structural net cash flows from operations 
(line ‘a’).  Primary structural net cash flows from operations are termed the primary 
structural balance.  The fiscal balance and the primary structural balance (both relative to 
nominal GDP) are plotted in Figure 2.  The primary structural balance is larger because it 
covers only operating expenditure and not the capital adjustment.  Although the primary 
structural balance is positive through the entire period, actual net cash flows from 
operations were negative in 1992 and 1993.  For example, there was a net cash flow 
deficit of $2,021 million in 1992.  The difference with respect to the primary structural 
balance is due to estimated cyclical factors of $866 million (the estimated output gap was 
negative) and $2,980 million of net interest payments. 
 
Table 3 – Base indicator of fiscal impulse 
 
Year ended June  2001 2002 2003 2004  2005  2006
$ million  Actual Est. Actual Forecast Forecast  Forecast  Forecast
Total cash from operations  38,471 40,964 42,436 44,488  46,467  48,301
Total cash to operations 36,549 38,160 39,725 41,391  42,930  44,686
Net cash flows from operations (NCFFO)  1,922 2,804 2,711 3,097  3,537  3,615
Structural NCFFO  1,976 2,861 2,653 2,974  3,537  3,615
Net interest payments  1,557 1,065 1,252 1,258  1,247  1,151
Primary structural NCFFO (a)  3,533 3,926 3,905 4,232  4,784  4,766
Capital adjustment 
Net purchases of physical assets (excluding 
defence)  842 950 1,224 1,022  942  969
Net increase in advances to students  668 708 773 799  810  821
Forecast for future new capital spending  
(excluding expected defence)  0 0 190 360  310  260
Total capital adjustment (b)  1,510 1,658 2,187 2,181  2,062  2,050
Fiscal balance ( = a - b) 2,023 2,268 1,718 2,051  2,722  2,716
Fiscal balance (% GDP) 1.8 1.9 1.4 1.6  2.0  1.9
Fiscal impulse (change in balance, % GDP) 0.9 0.1 -0.5 0.2  0.4  -0.1
Memorandum items 
Primary structural NCFFO (a) (% GDP)  3.1 3.3 3.1 3.2  3.5  3.3
Change in primary structural NCFFO (% GDP) 1.1 0.2 -0.1 0.1  0.3  -0.2
Depreciation  925 943 1,013 1,059  1,084  1,106
Nominal GDP  114,145 120,309 124,964 131,293  137,201  143,026 
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Figure 2 – Primary structural balance and fiscal balance 
 
 
Source: The Treasury 
In broad terms, changes in the balances plotted in Figure 2 suggest a tightening of fiscal 
policy in the early 1990s, followed by a loosening until the late-1990s.  This reflects the 
1996 and 1998 tax cuts (which occurred in the 1997 and 1999 fiscal years) and increases 
in primary expenditure.  Between 1996 and 2000, both the primary structural balance and 
the fiscal balance declined by 3.8 percentage points of GDP.  Estimated primary structural 
receipts decreased from 35.1% of GDP in 1996 to 32.6% in 2000.  Estimated primary 
structural (operating) expenditures were 29.4% in 1996 and 30.6% in 2000.
16
  I n  
recognition of the potentially different effects of taxes and spending, Figure 3 shows the 
paths of primary structural receipts and primary structural outlays, where outlays are 
operating plus the capital adjustment. 
 
                                                                 
16 New Zealand’s fiscal consolidation was concentrated in the early to mid-1990s, whereas OECD countries generally consolidated in 
the latter half of the decade. Analysis by the OECD (1999, Figure I.9, p.21) indicates that over the period 1995 to 1999, only two out of 
twenty OECD countries experienced a fall in their estimated structural fiscal balance, New Zealand and Japan. (In order to facilitate the 
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Figure 3 – Primary structural receipts and primary structural outlays 
 
 
Source: The Treasury 
For a country running structural fiscal deficits, an increase in the absolute value of the 
structural deficit is typically defined as expansionary.  In a situation of structural surpluses, 
an increase in the absolute value of the structural fiscal surplus should be interpreted as a 
tightening of policy relative to the previous year.  Note that 1992 is lost because fiscal 
impulse is calculated as a change.  Figure 4 indicates that the inclusion of the capital 
adjustment has some influence on the interpretation of fiscal impulses relative to changes 
in the primary structural balance.  For example, fiscal impulses in the early to mid-1990s 
differ somewhat in terms of magnitude, although across history and the forecast period 
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Figure 4 – Base indicator of fiscal impulse and change in primary structural balance  
 
 
Source: The Treasury 
Heller  et al. (1986) caution that fiscal impulse at best “…provides a measure of the 
magnitude of the initial stimulus to aggregate demand arising from the net effects of fiscal 
policy in a given period” (p.4).  Whether a particular fiscal impulse actually has an 
expansionary or contractionary effect depends on some of the issues and limitations 
raised in Section 2 (i.e., levels of government debt, expectations surrounding the 
permanence of the change, monetary policy conditions and the mix of tax and spending 
changes behind the fiscal impulse).   For these reasons it is inappropriate to compare 
fiscal impulses of approximately equal magnitude (e.g., the base indicator in 1993 and 
2005) as having equal effects on aggregate demand. 
Some of the relevant judgments to consider when assessing whether a contractionary 
fiscal impulse will actually have a contractionary impact on the economy include the 
composition of the change in fiscal policy (e.g., between changes in taxes, transfer 
payments, public sector employment and wages, and investment).  Expectations and 
assumptions about the degree of foresight of consumers may also be relevant.  For 
example, New Zealand’s longer-term bias towards structural tightening (at least in the 
initial stages of partially pre-funding future New Zealand Superannuation expenses) could 
mean that an increasing structural fiscal surplus is less contractionary on the economy 
than in the absence of such a pre-signalled bias. 
Alesina and Perotti (1995) use a classification system to identify significant fiscal 
expansions and contractions.
17
  Measurement of fiscal impulse is uncertain, and it is 
useful to identify how large the change in fiscal policy should be before it is considered 
“expansionary” or “contractionary”.   
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Re-writing the Alesina and Perotti definition for the budget balance instead of the budget 
deficit, fiscal impulses are: 
 … when the fiscal indicator is: 
  Very loose  less than minus 1.5 % of GDP 
  Loose  between minus 0.5 and minus 1.5 % of GDP 
  Neutral  between minus 0.5 and 0.5 % of GDP 
  Tight  between 0.5 and 1.5 % of GDP 
  Very tight  more than 1.5 % of GDP 
 
Using this system, historical fiscal impulses from the base indicator in Figure 4 were 
reasonably “tight” in the years from 1993 to 1996, and 2001 and “loose” in 1997, 1999 and 
2000.  Only one of the historical impulses, in 1997, exceeds the very tight/loose 
boundaries.   
 
Although the fiscal balance generally follows the primary structural balance in Figure 2, 
there are occasions where the nature of the capital adjustment creates a divergence.  This 
divergence feeds through into the fiscal impulses in Figure 4.  The year ending June 2001, 
which is the last actual observation, shows a tightening compared to 2000.  The change in 
the capital adjustment between these two years is modest and the tightening reflects an 
increase in the primary structural balance (refer Figure 2). 
Looking forward, primary structural balances are forecast to average just over 3% of GDP.  
These balances are lower after the capital adjustment is made (although note that the 
capital adjustment in the forecast period is on average larger than in the historical period).  
The base indicator fiscal impulses are on average closer to neutral over the forecast 
horizon as the impulses are in the minus 0.5 to +0.5 range.  Estimates of fiscal impulse 
over the forecast horizon should be treated more cautiously than the historical estimates 
for two reasons.  First, estimates of potential output are more uncertain toward the end of 
the historical sample period and into the forecast horizon.  Second, the indicator is based 
on  ex ante spending intentions.  Delays in the implementation of spending plans, 
especially on the capital side will mean a change in the timing of the actual demand 
impact.  
4.3  Approach to identifying discretionary policy 
This section compares the two-step method of cyclical adjustment with the Heller et al. 
method and the Blanchard Fiscal Impulse (see the Appendix).  Note that the same capital 
component is included in each method. 
Figure 5 shows that in all years the Heller et al. measure of fiscal impulse is the same sign 
as the base indicator and of a broadly similar magnitude.  This stems largely from the fact 
that developments in potential output are central to both indicators.  The Heller et. al. 
method does not adjust for the elasticity of taxes with respect to output (see Appendix).  
However, this does not create a divergence because the assumed elasticity is close to 
unity.     
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Figure 5 – Comparisons of discretionary measures 
 
 
Source: The Treasury 
The similarity between these two methods endorses the findings of Chalk (2002) noted in 
Section 2.2 above.  In contrast, the BFI differs in direction from the base indicator in a 
number of years.  Like the other two measures, the BFI picks up the easing of 1997.  Yet 
in 2001 the BFI suggests a close to neutral fiscal impulse, whereas the other indicators 
suggest a tightening.  Unlike the two other methods, the BFI relies on developments in 
unemployment.  Changes in unemployment need not track closely with developments in 
the output gap (e.g., there may be a lag).  All three indicators tell a similar story over the 
forecast period.  However, it is likely that the similarity reflects the relatively small 
economic cycle and stable unemployment rates over the forecast period compared to 
history, so that there is less difference between the different methods of adjusting for the 
cycle.   
4.4 Capital  adjustments 
The capital adjustment requires judgements about which capital items to include.   
Because the trend in the two balances in Figure 2 is broadly similar over time the fiscal 
impulses tell a reasonably similar story.  The years where there are differences between 
the indicators reflect changes in capital spending.  For example, in 2003 the increase in 
forecast capital spending means that the base indicator shows fiscal policy is loosening, 
while the primary structural balance shows that fiscal policy is closer to neutral. 
Figure 6 looks at the sensitivity of fiscal impulses to different capital adjustments.  The 
base indicator of fiscal impulse is compared with two alternative capital definitions.  The 
first alternative is a ”narrow” capital definition that includes net purchases of physical 
assets and forecast future new capital spending.  In contrast to the base indicator this 
definition includes all actual and expected defence capital purchases.  This narrow 
definition is similar to the measures used by the United Kingdom and Australian 
Treasuries.  It is arguably a better proxy of direct resource claims and brings the fiscal 
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capital definition that covers the base indicator (i.e., with defence excluded) and a wider 
range of financial transactions from Table 1.  This definition includes advances to 
hospitals (excluding refinancing of existing loans) and net purchase of investments, 
excluding the sale of Contact Energy, Auckland and Wellington airports, Forestry 





Figure 6 – Fiscal impulse under alternative capital adjustments 
 
 
Source: The Treasury 
The alternative capital definitions generate some differences in the indicators of fiscal 
impulse.  In particular, under the broad definition there is a relatively large capital 
adjustment in 1995, followed by a smaller adjustment in 1996.  The primary structural 
surplus increases smoothly over these years.  As a result, differences in the size of the 
capital adjustment are the key reason behind the differences in the fiscal impulses in 
1996, where the broad definition shows a marked spike.  Although most components of 
capital evolve relatively smoothly through time, net purchases of investments are 
reasonably volatile, with a large positive value in 1995 and a large negative in 1996 (see 
Figure 7).  These changes reflect capital flows associated with reforms to the electricity 
sector and balance sheet restructuring in the health sector and Housing New Zealand. 
With the exception of one year (the 2004 forecast), the base indicator and narrow capital 
definition yield fiscal impulses of the same sign and similar magnitude.  Factors that would 
cause the base indicator to diverge from the broad capital definition include large changes 
in advances and net purchases of investments.  Given our initial focus on the core Crown 
we exclude advances (other than student loans) and net purchases of investments from 
the base indicator.  As noted in Section 4.1, these items are proxies for discretionary 
                                                                 
18 Hospital deficit funding occurs through equity injections, and is recorded as an increase in investments.  The funding for the deficit 
generally occurs in the year after the actual deficit took place. A more accurate assessment would move deficit funding to the actual 
year that the deficit occurred. However, because this funding has occurred every year, this adjustment is judged immaterial in 
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capital spending outside the core Crown.  Refining the indicator to better capture the role 
of Crown entities will increase its robustness to major changes in capital spending.      
 
Figure 7 – Components of the capital adjustment 
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5 Concluding  Remarks 
An indicator of fiscal impulse attempts to measure whether the government’s overall fiscal 
policy decisions are adding to, or subtracting from, aggregate demand pressures in the 
economy.  This paper has outlined the conceptual issues in measuring fiscal impulse and 
developed indicators for New Zealand.  Although the general approach of governments 
has been to allow automatic fiscal stabilisers to operate, for macroeconomic stability 
reasons government may be interested in the effects of changes in fiscal policies on 
aggregate demand.  It is useful to have an indicator of fiscal impulse as a first round 
approximation of these effects.  
There is no generally accepted indicator of fiscal impulse.  This paper has outlined some 
key decisions that need to be made in calculating an indicator and made some 
judgements on these decisions.   
Indicators of fiscal impulse can enhance the ex post interpretation of fiscal policy as well 
as help to identify relatively large ex ante forecast changes.  The base indicator calculated 
in this paper reflects intuitive judgements about changes in discretionary fiscal policy over 
the last decade and looking forward.  Using an alternative method of isolating the 
discretionary component of fiscal policy, but one that still relies on potential output 
generates fiscal impulses similar to the base indicator.  However, the use of the Blanchard 
fiscal impulse method, which does not use potential output, creates some differences in 
both the sign and magnitude of fiscal impulses.  The broad similarity of alternative 
discretionary decomposition techniques over the forecast horizon reflects the small 
economic cycle and stable unemployment rates in the 2002 Budget forecasts.  In addition, 
the fiscal indicators are based on ex ante spending intentions.  Delays in the 
implementation of spending plans, especially on the capital side will mean a change in the 
timing of the actual demand impact.  On the capital side, a broader definition of capital 
presents a somewhat different picture of fiscal impulses.  This suggests future refinements 
in terms of defining the definition of the government sector.       
As with any indicator, the indicator of fiscal impulse has limitations.  At best it provides 
only an indication of the first round impact of fiscal policy on aggregate demand.  There 
are other factors that need to be taken into account when assessing the full impact of 
changes in fiscal policy on the economy, for example, the composition of the change in 
fiscal policy.  Analysis based on a full-scale macroeconomic model, perhaps 
complemented with time series analysis can help provide a complete assessment of the 
impact of fiscal policy on the economy.  
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Appendix 
1.  The structural fiscal balance  
The structural fiscal balance provides an estimate of what the fiscal balance would be if 
the economy were at potential output.  The Treasury’s approach to estimating the 
structural fiscal balance is outlined in more detail in Tam and Kirkham (2001).  The 
approach utilises the estimated output gap and the sensitivity of tax receipts and 
unemployment expenditures to output.
19
  The output gap is measured as: 
 
 
* * / ) ( t t t t Y Y Y gap − =  (1.1) 
where Yt is actual real GDP in year t and Yt
* is potential real GDP in year t.  A positive 
(negative) value for gapt indicates that actual real GDP is above (below) potential real 
GDP.  For the calculation of the structural balance, the Treasury estimates the output gap 
using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter.
20
  The structural balance is calculated using 
cyclically adjusted receipts, cyclically adjusted unemployment expenditure, and other 
operating expenditures.   
The responsiveness of receipts to output depends on two effects, the responsiveness of 
the tax type to a change in its base (eT,B) and the responsiveness of the tax base to a 
change in output (eB,Y).  Cyclically-adjusted receipts are calculated as: 
  )) ( 1 ( , , ,
*
, t Y T i t i t i gap e R R − × + =  (1.2) 
 where:    Ri,t
* = cyclically adjusted nominal receipts item i in year t 
  Ri,t = actual nominal receipt item i in year t 
  gapt = output gap in year t  
  ei,T,Y = ei,T,B ×  ei,B,Y  for each receipts item i.  
The elasticities for the different receipt items, with respect to output, are as follows: 
 
Receipt item     Elasticity 
Individual income tax      1.12 
Company tax      1.10 
Withholding tax/Other direct tax      1.10 
GST      1.10 
Excise duties      1.00 
Other indirect tax      1.00 
Interest, profits and dividends     0.00 
Other receipts      1.00 
Source: The Treasury 
 
                                                                 
19 When the approach is applied to cash measures, as is the case for the indicators in this paper, receipts and expenditure are the 
appropriate terms.   
20 Tam and Kirkham (2001) use a structural time series model (STAMP) to estimate potential output. They examine the sensitivity of 
the estimated structural balance to alternative methods of calculating potential output.   
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The cyclically adjusted unemployment rate is derived using the output gap and an Okun 
coefficient β , which is assumed to be 0.5.
21
   
  ) ( t t t gap U U − − =
∗ β  (1.3) 
where Ut  is the actual unemployment rate in year t and Ut
* is benchmark unemployment 
rate in year t.  Cyclically adjusted unemployment expenditure is assumed to move 
proportionally to the ratio of unemployment to benchmark unemployment. 
 
  52 ) (
*
* × × × =
t
t
t t t U
U
ies beneficiar benefit average UE  (1.4) 
 where:  UEt
* = cyclically adjusted nominal unemployment expenditure in year t 
  average.benefitt  = average weekly benefit in year t 
  beneficiariest = number of unemployment beneficiaries in year t. 
2.  Heller, Haas and Mansur (1986) measure of fiscal 
impulse 
Start with the following definition of the fiscal balance (where notation has been changed 
to match that used elsewhere in this paper and the measures are on a primary basis): 
  ) ( t t t G R FB − =  (2.1) 
where FBt  is the primary fiscal balance in year t, Rt denotes primary government nominal 
receipts in year t and Gt  is primary government nominal expenditure in year t.  The fiscal 
balance is decomposed as follows: 






0  (2.2) 
 where:  r0 = R0 / Y0  base year primary nominal receipts-to-nominal GDP  
 g 0 = G0 / Y0  base year primary nominal expenditure-to-nominal GDP 
 Y t = actual GDP in nominal prices in year t 
  Yt
* = potential GDP in nominal prices in year t 
 R t  = as defined above 
  Gt  = as defined above 
 FSt = measure of the fiscal stance in year t. 
 
The base year (denoted by the subscript 0) is a year in which actual and potential real 
GDP are approximately equal (i.e., zero output gap).  In our calculations, 1994 has the 
smallest estimated output gap.  The first right-hand-side term in equation (2.2) is the “base 
year surplus”.  The second term is the cyclical component.  Equation (2.2) can be re-
written as: 
  t t t t FS Y g Y r FB − − = ) (
*
0 0  (2.3) 
Fiscal stance can be expressed as: 
  ) ( ) (
*
0 0 t t t t t G Y g R Y r FS − − − =  (2.4) 
                                                                 
21 See Tam and Kirkham (2001) for details.   
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This is the formulation presented in Chalk (2002, Table 1).  Note that unlike the structural 
balance method, fiscal stance here assumes that nominal taxes are unit elastic with 
respect to output.  Government expenditures are assumed to be unit elastic with respect 
to potential output in nominal prices.  So: 
•  Government receipts are cyclically neutral if they increase proportionately with 
increases in nominal actual GDP.  A more than proportionate increase is 
contractionary regardless of the source (i.e., from either discretionary policy or a 
progressive tax structure). 
•  Government expenditures are cyclically neutral if they increase proportionately with 
increases in nominal potential GDP.  A more than proportionate increase is 
expansionary regardless of the source (i.e., from either discretionary policy or 
inflation). 
Although the measure makes a cyclical adjustment, it includes changes generated by 
elasticities of taxes and spending with respect to output that differ from unity.
22
  Defining 
the cyclically neutral terms in this way allocates the contribution of automatic fiscal 
stabilisers that arise from non-unit elasticities to the measure of fiscal impulse.  The first 
difference of equation (2.4) gives a measure of fiscal impulse (FI): 
  ) ( ) ( 0
*
0 t t t t t t Y r R Y g G FS FI ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ = ∆ =  (2.5a) 
  t t t Y r Y g FB ∆ + ∆ − ∆ − = 0
*
0  (2.5b) 
Heller et al. use ∆ (FS/Y) as a measure of fiscal impulse relative to output.  The ratio of 
fiscal stance to GDP in a particular year indicates how the fiscal policy stance has 
changed relative to the base year (where by definition, fiscal stance is neutral).  Fiscal 
impulse in a given year reflects the change in stance.  If FS/Y is unchanged between two 
periods (i.e., ∆ (FS/Y) = 0) then no additional impulse has occurred.  A positive (negative) 
value for fiscal impulse indicates that fiscal policy is more expansionary (contractionary) 
relative to the previous year.  To ensure consistency with the other measures in this 
paper, we reverse the sign of the impulse measure so that a positive (negative) indicates 
a tightening (loosening) with respect to the previous year. 
3.  Blanchard fiscal impulse 
The Blanchard Fiscal Impulse (BFI) is an indictor of discretionary fiscal policy, and is 
defined as the value of the primary surplus which would have prevailed, were 
unemployment at the same value as in the previous year, minus the value of the primary 
surplus in the previous year, both as a ratio to GDP in each year.   
   () ( ) 1 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( − − − − − − − = t t t t t t t g r U g U r BFI  (3.1) 
where  r denotes primary government receipts (% GDP) in each year, g is primary 
government expenditure (% GDP) in each year and U is the unemployment rate.  The BFI 
has been calculated using the equations, elasticities and Okun coefficient from the 
Treasury’s structural adjustment approach.  The Okun relationship provides the link from 
output to unemployment.  The Okun relationship in this case is specified as: 
                                                                 
22 That is, the output gap still has an influence that needs to be adjusted for even if there is a unit elasticity. Elasticities above unity 
imply that the cycle has a more than one-for-one effect.   
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   (3.2) 
Now convert (1.2) into changes in output from the previous year, rather than deviation in 
output from potential: 
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Convert (3.3) into changes in unemployment from the previous year by substituting in the 
Okun relationship (3.2) above.  Convert (1.4) into the relationship between current and 
lagged unemployment, rather than current and benchmark unemployment.  This gives an 
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Ri  ,t  (Ut-1)  is a measure of a receipt item in year t had the unemployment rate of the 
previous period prevailed.  Similarly, UEt (Ut-1) is unemployment expenditure in year t had 
the unemployment rate of the previous period prevailed.  Rt(Ut-1) is total receipts in year t 
at the previous years unemployment rate, and is derived by aggregating the adjusted 
receipt items (i.e., from equation 3.4).  Gt(Ut-1) is derived by combining adjusted 
unemployment expenditure (from equation 3.5) with other operating expenditure.  The BFI 
can be calculated by substituting Rt(Ut-1) and Gt(Ut-1) into the equation for the BFI (3.1) 
above, and converting to % of GDP. 
4.  The New Zealand Treasury’s EFI  
The New Zealand Treasury developed an Economic and Fiscal Indicator (see Treasury’s 
Briefing to the Incoming Government 1996, p.61), which showed whether fiscal policy is 
tighter or looser in one year relative to another year.  The key difference between the EFI 
and other indicators of fiscal impulse is that the EFI attempts to take into account the 
composition of government expenditure and taxes.  The approach taken was to consider 
how a change in fiscal policy affects the components of aggregate demand (consumption, 
investment, government spending, and net exports), including the feed through 
parameters and elasticities.  The indicator is the sum of the effect of the change in fiscal 
policy on each of these components. 
The key benefit of the EFI is that it takes into account the composition of fiscal policy, so 
that it may provide additional information in the case of a balanced budget change in fiscal 
policy.  It also accounts for different reactions by different households, by assuming that 
some households are liquidity constrained while others are not. 
The key disadvantages of the EFI are that the calculation is subjective and relies on 
judgements around economic theory and parameters such as elasticities, it is not 
cyclically adjusted and it is not internationally comparable.  In addition, changes in the 
operating balance were found to proxy reasonably well any changes in the EFI under a 
variety of scenarios.  The multiplier effects in the EFI and the inclusion of some capital 
transactions do not appear to cause substantial differences to the story being told.  Even  
WP 02/30 |  INDICATORS OF FISCAL IMPULSE FOR NEW ZEALAND  30  
the EFI could not provide a complete assessment of the impact of fiscal policy on the 
economy because it is only a partial model.  For example, it does not contain a supply 
side, or a monetary policy reaction function. 